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Abstract
We show how a (big) PEZ dispenser can be used by two or more players to compute a
function of their inputs while hiding the values of the inputs from each other. In contrast to
traditional approaches for solving this problem, ours does not require any use of randomness.
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1. Introduction
The story. Consider a group of kids who wish to vote between two candidates without
revealing anything except the <nal outcome. To their aid is a PEZ dispenser, which
may be pre-loaded with some publicly known sequence of red and yellow candies. 2
The kids take turns, where in each turn one of the kids, based on her vote, decides how
many candies to pop out of the dispenser. (No other kid can see the number or the
colors of these candies; neither can a kid weigh the dispenser and deduce the number
of remaining candies.) The pre-loaded color sequence and the kids’ instructions must
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Princeton, NJ 08544-2087, USA.
E-mail addresses: jobal@math.ohio-state.edu (J. Balogh), janos@csirik.net (J.A. Csirik),
yuvali@cs.technion.ac.il (Y. Ishai), eyalk@cs.technion.ac.il (E. Kushilevitz).
1 Work done while at AT&T Labs—Research.
2 For those who are unfamiliar with PEZ dispensers: A PEZ dispenser is a stack-like physical device from
which candies can be popped one at a time. Just looking at the dispenser, it is impossible to determine the
number and colors of the candies inside. For the purpose of this work we recommend (but are in no way
aJliated with) http://www.candywarehouse.com/giantpez.html.
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be arranged so that: (1) at the end of the above process, the color of the candy at
the top of the dispenser corresponds to the correct majority vote; (2) no kid can tell
anything about the remaining kids’ votes from the colors of the candies she took out
of the dispenser. The voting process is completed by having one of the kids pop an
additional candy and announce its color. The above two requirements guarantee that
only the correct outcome is learned.
The problem. A more general and precise formulation of the problem is the following.
There are n deterministic players P1; : : : ; Pn, where n¿2. Each player Pi holds an input
xi ∈, and together they wish to compute some function f:n→	 of their inputs
while hiding their inputs from each other. The players are assumed to be honest-but-
curious: they follow their instructions, but may try to deduce information about the
other players’ inputs from what they see. 3 The players are allowed to interact with a
very restricted trusted party, which implements the functionality of a PEZ dispenser.
This interaction is prescribed by a protocol of the following form. The trusted party is
initialized with a <xed string 
∈	∗, depending only on f. The protocol then proceeds
by a sequence of moves. At each move, some predetermined player Pi asks the trusted
party to see the next k symbols of 
, where k depends deterministically on Pi’s input
xi. Upon termination, the protocol’s output is de<ned to be the <rst untouched symbol
of 
. (We may assume that one of the players reads this symbol and announces it to
whoever is supposed to learn the output.) A protocol as above is said to be a private
PEZ protocol computing f if it satis<es the following two requirements:
Correctness: On any input x=(x1; : : : ; xn)∈n the protocol’s output is equal to the
correct value f(x).
Privacy: No player or set of players can learn any information about the other
players’ inputs from the symbols they read (excluding the last symbol, which contains
the protocol’s output). Equivalently, the substring of 
 read by each player Pi in each
of its moves is completely determined by xi, independently of all other inputs. 4
A simple observation is that if we remove the privacy requirement, then any function
f can be correctly computed as follows. For simplicity, assume that =	={0; 1}.
The initial string 
 will contain the truth-table of f, where the inputs are ordered by
lexicographic order (i.e., the 2n-bit string f(000 : : : 00); f(000 : : : 01); : : : ; f(111 : : : 11)).
In move j; 16j6n, player Pj will ask to read 2n−j · xj bits (i.e., either 2n−j bits or
none). At the end of this protocol, the <rst unread bit of 
 is the bit corresponding
to the input x, whose value is f(x). Unfortunately, this solution completely fails to
satisfy the privacy requirement: a player who reads a long sequence of bits from the
truth-table of f will typically be able to infer the location of this sequence, thereby
learning information about the inputs of other players. This illustrates the apparent
diJculty of designing private PEZ protocols for non-trivial functions. We refer the
3 This assumption also models an attack by a passive adversary, who has access to all of the information
available to the players it corrupts but cannot control their behavior.
4 This privacy requirement may seem stronger than needed: it does not allow players to learn information
that follows from the value f(x) before the last symbol is read. The stricter de<nition is useful for making
the model more robust. For instance, it provides maximal privacy even in a case where f(x) should be
learned only by some subset of the players or by an external party.
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reader to Appendix A for a further discussion of the model, its robustness, and some
of its natural variants.
Before presenting some examples of private PEZ protocols and describing our results
we shall try to motivate the problem and put it in context.
Recreational cryptography. Our problem is best viewed as a mathematical game, and
more speci<cally as a “recreational cryptography” problem. By this we mean that we
are mainly motivated by its sheer aesthetic qualities and are not aware of any real-
world application of any sort. 5 Saying that, however, mathematical games can still
yield interesting insights and techniques that might be employed in other contexts, as
well as a conceptual understanding of the underlying problems. Indeed, several recre-
ational cryptography problems have already attracted a signi<cant amount of interest.
Examples include Visual Cryptography, introduced by Naor and Shamir [10], crypto-
graphic protocols based on a deal of cards, studied by Fischer and Wright [6], Cr&epeau
and Kilian [4] and others, and the study of various approaches for comparing values
without revealing them [5]. For additional recreational cryptography work see [9] and
references therein. Similarly to the above works, we also suggest a physically realizable
implementation of a cryptographic primitive. In contrast, however, our implementation
does not require any use of randomness.
Secure multiparty computation. The PEZ model may be viewed as a speci<c model for
secure computation. While our problem is very diRerent in nature from the mainstream
line of work in this area, initiated in [2,3,7,12], it is still instructive to put it in this
more general context. The original motivation of our research was a study of the
power of trusted parties in secure protocols in general, and in particular in the context
of the amount of randomness used by the players. In what follows, we explain how
the PEZ problem is related to these issues. It is well known that (without a trusted
party) randomness is essential for secure computation (see, e.g., [8]). Obviously, when
a trusted party is available, there is a simple deterministic solution to the problem:
each player sends its input to the trusted party, who computes the desired value f(x)
by itself and announces the result. This solution, however, puts all the computational
burden on the trusted party and so the question is raised whether a similar deterministic
solution is still possible using a weaker trusted party. The main conclusion of our
work is a surprising aJrmative answer to an instance of this question: even a severely
handicapped, physically realizable, and inherently “leaky” trusted party (as the one
described above) allows nontrivial deterministic secure computation.
Two examples. As a <rst and simple example of a private PEZ protocol, consider the
following protocol for the function ANDn : {0; 1}n→{0; 1}, computing the product of
the n input bits. We use the initial string

 = 0 0 : : : 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
1:
Each player Pi in its turn reads a single bit of 
 if its input xi is 1 and otherwise
it reads nothing. It is clear that if all players have the input 1 (i.e., ANDn(x)= 1)
then the output will be 1, whereas otherwise the output will be 0. Moreover, each
5 Other than, of course, playing with your kids.
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Move Player #bits read #bits read substring read substring read
on input 0 on input 1 on input 0 on input 1
1 P1 5 0 10010 –
2 P2 0 3 – 100
3 P3 0 2 – 10
4 P2 0 1 – 1
5 P3 0 1 – 0
6 P2 1 0 1 –
7 P1 0 1 – 0
Fig. 1. A private PEZ protocol for MAJ3 using initial string 
=1001010010101.
player when reading a bit from the string 
 always gets the bit 0 (independently of the
inputs of other players) and hence privacy is maintained. In general, however, things
are not as simple. For most functions it is not easy to <nd PEZ protocols and it does
not even seem clear that such protocols exist. This is the case also for some very
simple functions. As a second example, let MAJ3 be the majority function on n=3
bits. Fig. 1 describes a private PEZ protocol for this function that uses the 13-bit string

=1001010010101 and has seven moves. 6 It can be manually veri<ed that for each
of the eight possible inputs in {0; 1}3, the substring of 
 that is supposed to be read
in each move is consistent with the number of bits read in previous moves, and that
the protocol has the correct output on each input.
Our results. We begin by studying the class of one-round PEZ protocols, i.e., protocols
in which each player makes at most one move (according to some predetermined order).
We show that the functions computable by these protocols are exactly those admitting a
decision list representation. Consequently, even simple functions such as the exclusive-
or of two bits cannot be computed by a one-round private PEZ protocol. We then
proceed to show our main result: if no restriction on the number of moves is made,
then, quite surprisingly, every function can be computed by a private PEZ protocol.
The length of the initial string 
 used by our general construction is doubly expo-
nential in the number of players n, while that of the protocols for decision lists is
“only” exponential. Hence, these constructions are feasible only when n is small. It
is important to note in this context that even without the privacy requirement, most
functions f (even explicit and simple ones) require exponential string length. 7
6 For each move we specify which player is reading from the PEZ string, how many bits she is reading
given each of her two possible inputs (0 or 1) and what substring she is expected to see in each case, where
‘-’ denotes the empty string.
7 A large class of Boolean functions requiring exponential complexity in the non-private PEZ model can
be obtained by communication complexity arguments. Using diRerent arguments, we show in Section 3 a
simple decision list for which the exponential complexity of our protocol is provably optimal (again, even
without the privacy requirement). This should be contrasted with the class of symmetric functions, which
do admit eJcient protocols in the non-private model.
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Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally
de<ne the model and study some of its basic properties. Section 3, studies the power
of one-round protocols, and Section 4 includes our general construction. In Section 5,
we mention some open problems. Finally, Appendix A discusses some issues related
to the robustness of the PEZ model.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we de<ne the private PEZ model and prove two basic closure proper-
ties which will be useful in the sequel. Some natural variants of the model are discussed
in Appendix A.
2.1. De;nitions
We start by formally de<ning the PEZ model and some notation related to PEZ
protocols.
De!nition 1. A PEZ protocol  for a function f:n→	 is de<ned by an initial string

∈	∗ and a sequence of m moves (M1; : : : ; Mm). Each move Mj consists of a pair
(ij; j), where ij is a player index (between 1 and n) and j : →{0; 1; : : : ; |
| − 1}
speci<es the number of symbols to read, for each possible value ∈ that input xij
may have. We will refer to the index sequence i1; i2; : : : ; im as the move order of .
We assume that for any x∈n; ∑mj=1 j(xij)¡|
| (so that the PEZ dispenser never
becomes empty during the execution of a protocol). A protocol  as above is said to
privately compute f if there exists a mapping  : [m]×→	∗ (specifying the string
read in each move on each possible input), such that:
1: for any j∈ [m] and ∈; |( j; )|= j(),
2: for any x∈n,
(1; xi1 ) ◦ (2; xi2 ) ◦ · · · ◦ (m; xim) ◦ f(x) 4 
; (1)
where ◦ denotes string concatenation and A4B signi<es that the string A is a pre<x
of the string B.
We note that De<nition 1 is somewhat redundant, in the sense that the strings ( j; )
are uniquely de<ned by 
 and the moves Mj. Conversely, the function  and the
move order i1; : : : ; im alone are suJcient to uniquely de<ne a protocol  computing f.
However, the above form of the de<nition will be convenient for our purposes.
Complexity: With a PEZ protocol  we associate two complexity measures: its
string length, denoted by length() and de<ned as |
| (the number of symbols in 
),
and the number of moves m, denoted by moves(). We say that  is a one-round
protocol if each player makes at most one move.
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2.2. Two closure properties
Towards understanding the power of PEZ computation, it is natural to ask whether a
protocol computing a function f can be eJciently converted into protocols for related
functions f′. We show two simple transformations that may be applied to arbitrary PEZ
protocols, preserving their privacy and complexity. The <rst transformation allows to
manipulate the output of a PEZ protocol.
Lemma 2 (Output substitution lemma). Let  be a private PEZ protocol computing
f:n→	, and let g : 	→	′ be an arbitrary symbol substitution function. Then,
there is a private PEZ protocol ′ computing the function f′(x) def= g(f(x)) with
length(′)6length() and moves(′)6moves().
Proof. A protocol ′ as required may be obtained from  by applying the output
substitution g to each symbol of 
. It is easy to see that the new protocol correctly
computes f′ and that the privacy of  is not violated by the symbol substitution.
In the case of Boolean functions (	= {0; 1}), Lemma 2 implies that computing a
function in the PEZ model is as hard as computing its negation. A somewhat more
surprising corollary is that the input concatenation function is the hardest to compute
in the PEZ model. More precisely:
Corollary 3. Suppose that IC computes the input concatenation function over  (that
is, the function IC which maps n symbols from  to the symbol from n correspond-
ing to their concatenation). Then, for every output alphabet 	 and every function
f:n→	 there is a PEZ protocol f computing f with length(f)6length(IC)
and moves(f)6moves(IC). 8
The second transformation, described next, allows to manipulate the inputs to a PEZ
protocol in a restricted way.
Lemma 4 (Projection lemma). Let  be a private PEZ protocol computing f:n→
	. Let : (′)n
′ →n be such that each of the n outputs of  depends on at most
a single input, and let f′: (′)n
′ →	 be the function de;ned by f′(x′) def= f((x′)).
Then, there is a PEZ protocol ′ computing f′ with length(′)6length() and
moves(′)6moves().
Proof (sketch). The idea is to let each player in ′ simulate the players in  whose
outputs of  are aRected by its input. Formally, let =(
;M1; M2; : : : ; Mm). A protocol
′=(
′; M ′1; : : : ; M
′
m) as required may be de<ned as follows. The initial string 

′ is
equal to 
. For each move Mj =(ij; j), let i′j be the index of the input of  on
which the ijth output of  depends (or 1 if the ijth output is a constant), and let
8 Recall that length(IC) is measured in terms of the number of symbols of the output alphabet, which
is n in this case.
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ij :
′→ be a mapping de<ning the ijth output of  as a function of its i′jth input.
The corresponding move M ′j is de<ned by M
′
j =(i
′
j ; ‘
′
j), where ‘
′
j(
′) def= j(ij (
′)) for
each ′ ∈′.
In the case of a binary input alphabet, Lemma 4 allows to restrict input variables,
permute them, and replace variables by their negations. Moreover, Lemma 4 implies
that, in some sense, it suJces to consider functions and protocols over a binary input
alphabet. This is formalized by the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Let f:n→	 be a function over an arbitrary alphabet , and let
k = 
log2 ||. Let E:→{0; 1}k be a bijection, mapping each symbol in  to a
distinct binary string. Let f′: {0; 1}nk →	 be the translation of f to a binary alpha-
bet, i.e., f′ is such that f′(E(x1) ◦ · · · ◦E(xn))=f(x1; : : : ; xn) for all (x1; : : : ; xn)∈n.
Then, any protocol ′ computing f′ can be converted into a protocol  computing
f such that length()6length(′) and moves()6moves(′).
Proof. The protocol  is obtained by applying Lemma 4 with (x1; : : : ; xn)
def= E(x1) ◦
· · · ◦E(xn) to the protocol ′.
3. One-round PEZ protocols
In this section we attempt to answer the following questions: (1) which functions can
be computed by a one-round private PEZ protocol? and (2) what is the cost (in terms
of string length) required by such a computation? We start by de<ning the decision
list computational model.
De!nition 6. A decision list with input alphabet  and output alphabet 	 is de<ned
by a list
L = 〈(i1; D1); (i2; D2); : : : ; (i‘; D‘); def〉;
where each ij ∈ [n] is an index of an input variable, each Dj:→	∪{⊥} decides,
based on xij , whether to output a speci<ed value or to continue, and def∈	 is a
default output value. The value L(x) computed by L on input x is the output of the
following program:
if (D1(xi1 ) = ⊥) output D1(xi1 ); else
if (D2(xi2 ) = ⊥) output D2(xi2 ); else
...
if (D‘(xi‘) = ⊥) output D‘(xi‘); else
output def;
We refer to ‘ as the length of L. We say that L is read-once if each input variable xi
appears at most once in L.
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Note that in the case of a binary input alphabet, any decision list L can be assumed
to be read-once (otherwise there exists a shorter decision list L′ computing the same
function). However, this is not true for general input alphabets. 9
We now show that any read-once decision list can be computed by a one-round
protocol. We start with the following composition lemma.
Lemma 7. Let  be a private PEZ protocol computing f:n→	 with an initial
string 
 of length l and with move order i1; i2; : : : ; im (i.e., player i1 plays in move
1; i2 in move 2, etc.). For i∈ [n] and D:→	∪{⊥}, de;ne a function fD; i:n→	
by
fD;i(x) =
{
f(x) D(xi) =⊥;
D(xi) otherwise:
Then, fD; i admits a protocol ′ with string length |D()| · l and player move order
i1; i2; : : : ; im; i.
Proof. We may assume that ⊥ ∈D(): otherwise fD; i depends only on xi, in which
case the lemma easily follows. Let D()= {⊥; $0; : : : ; $k−1}, and let $= $0 ◦ $1 ◦ · · · ◦
$k−1. A protocol ′ as required can be constructed as follows. Its initial string 
′ is
de<ned by

′ = $ ◦ 
1 ◦ $ ◦ 
2 ◦ · · · ◦ $ ◦ 
l:
The move structure of ′ is as follows. First, the m moves of  are executed, where
the number of symbols read at each move is multiplied by k + 1. By the correctness
of , at the end of these moves the <rst k + 1 unread symbols of 
 are $ ◦f(x).
In the <nal move of ′, player Pi will read k symbols if D(xi)=⊥ and k ′ symbols,
06k ′¡k, if D(xi)= $k′ . Thus, the output of ′ is equal to f(x) if D(xi)= ⊥ and is
equal to D(xi) otherwise. The privacy of ′ follows from the privacy of  and from
the fact that the additional symbols read by Pi in the last move are determined by xi.
Theorem 8. Let L= 〈(i1; D1); (i2; D2); : : : ; (i‘; D‘); def〉 be a read-once decision list with
input alphabet  and output alphabet 	. Then, L can be computed by a one-round
private PEZ protocol with move order i‘; i‘−1; : : : ; i1 and string length k‘, where
k = min(||; |	|+ 1).
Proof. We use induction on ‘. If ‘=0, then L= 〈def〉 computes a constant function,
which admits a trivial one-round protocol with string length 1 and no moves. Now,
consider a length-‘ read-once decision list L= 〈(i1; D1); (i2; D2); : : : ; (i‘; D‘); def〉. By
the induction’s hypothesis, the sub-list L′= 〈(i2; D2); : : : ; (i‘; D‘); def〉 has a one-round
protocol L′ with a string 
′ of length k‘−1 and move order i‘; i‘−1; : : : ; i2. (Note that
9 Corollary 5 reduces the task of computing a general function f to that of computing a function f′ over
a binary input alphabet. However, it does not guarantee that if f can be computed in one round then so
can f′. We will, therefore, address the general case in this section.
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if L is read-once then so is L′.) A protocol L computing L can now be obtained
by applying Lemma 7 to =L′ with i= i1 and D=D1. Since |D()|6k, the string
length of L is at most k · k‘−1 = k‘.
To get a complete characterization of the class of functions computable by one-round
protocols, we prove the following converse of Theorem 8.
Theorem 9. Suppose that f:n→	 can be computed by a one-round private PEZ
protocol. Then, f can be computed by a read-once decision list.
Proof. We prove by induction on m that if f is computed by an m-move one-round
protocol , then f can also be computed by a read-once decision list L of length m
whose variables correspond to the active players in . If m=0, then f is a constant
function, which can be computed by a length-0 decision list. Now, suppose that f
is computed by an m-move one-round protocol  with move order i1; : : : ; im and last
move Mm=(im; m). We will use this last move to de<ne the <rst decision of L.
Let k = max(m()), and let ˆ∈ be some symbol on which this maximum is
attained (that is, xim = ˆ maximizes the number of symbols read by Pim on move m).
Let f′ denote the function f restricted by xim = ˆ. The correctness of  implies that
the same f′ is obtained if ˆ is replaced by any other ˆ′ such that m(ˆ′)= k. Let 
be as promised in De<nition 1, i.e., ( j; ) is the substring of 
 read on move j when
xij = , and let $= (m; ˆ). We de<ne a function D : →	∪{⊥} as follows:
D() =
{⊥; () = k;
$()+1 otherwise:
We will now argue that for any x∈n,
f(x) =
{
f′(x); D(xim) =⊥;
D(xim) otherwise:
(2)
Let = xim . It follows directly from the de<nition of f
′ that if ()= k then f(x)=
f′(x). It remains to show that if ()¡k then f(x)= $()+1(=D(xim)). By Eq. (1)
we have
(1; xi1 ) ◦ · · · ◦ (m− 1; xim−1 ) ◦ (m; ) ◦ f(x) 4 
: (3)
Letting x′ be the input obtained from x by changing position im to ˆ, we also have
(1; xi1 ) ◦ · · · ◦ (m− 1; xim−1 ) ◦ $ ◦ f(x′) 4 
: (4)
From (3), (4), and the fact that (m; )¡k = |$|, we may conclude that
(m; ) ◦ f(x) 4 $;
implying that f(x)= $|(m;)|+1, as required.
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Finally, observe that the restriction f′ can be privately computed by a protocol ′
with move order i1; : : : ; im−1. Such a ′ can be obtained from  by letting Pim−1 play
the role of Pim on input ˆ. Formally, the <rst m−2 moves of ′ are as in , and its last
move is (im−1; m−1+k). By the induction’s hypothesis, f′ admits a read-once decision
list L′ over the variables i1; : : : ; im−1. It follows from Eq. (2) that L
def= (im; D) ◦L′ is
a read-once decision list for f over the variables i1; : : : ; im, as required.
Theorem 9 shows that privacy comes at a price. Indeed, while any function can be
computed in one round in the non-private variant of the PEZ model, for most functions
this is not the case in the private model. The simplest example of a function which
cannot be computed by a decision list is the exclusive-or of 2 bits. In the next section,
we will see that three moves (“a round and a half”) are already suJcient to privately
compute this function.
Combining Theorems 8, 9, we get
Corollary 10. A function f:n→	 admits a one-round private PEZ protocol if and
only if it can be computed by a read-once decision list.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the string length of decision
lists in the PEZ model. The upper bound given by Theorem 8 is exponential in the
decision list length. While it is possible to do much better for some special classes of
decision lists (generalizing the ANDn example from the introduction), we show that
this is not the case in general.
Theorem 11. Let L= 〈(1; D1); (2; D2); : : : ; (n; Dn); n + 1〉 be a decision list over in-
put alphabet = {0; 1} and output alphabet 	= [n + 1], such that Di(0)= ⊥ and
Di(1)= i for 16i6n (i.e., L outputs the ;rst index where the input is non-zero or
n+ 1 if no such index exists). Then, even if the privacy requirement is dropped, the
string length of every PEZ protocol computing L is at least 2n + 1.
Proof. Let  be a correct (but not necessarily private) PEZ protocol for L, and for
x∈{0; 1}n let wx be the total number of symbols read on input x. Assume towards
a contradiction that length()62n. It follows that wx¡2n for every x, and so there
must exist distinct x′; x′′ such that wx′ =wx′′ . Moreover, we can assume that there
is no position i such that x′i = x
′′
i =1; otherwise, both x and x
′ can be changed to
0 in every such position i without violating the equality wx′ =wx′′ . But this implies
that L(x′) =L(x′′), since the smallest position i such that x′i =1 must diRer from the
smallest position i such that x′′i =1. This contradicts the assumption that wx′ =wx′′ .
4. A general construction
The goal of this section is to construct a private PEZ protocol for every function
f:n→	. By Corollary 5, we may restrict our attention to the case of a binary
input alphabet. Furthermore, by Corollary 3 it suJces to speci<cally consider the input
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concatenation function IC : {0; 1}n→{0; 1}n. Our construction may indeed be viewed
as applying to this speci<c function. However, to make its presentation more explicit
we will directly apply our construction to a general function f: {0; 1}n→	.
Notation: Throughout this section, we will index the players and the input variables
by 0; 1; : : : ; n − 1 (rather than 1; 2; : : : ; n). For an integer m, the ith bit of m is the
coeJcient of 2i in the binary expansion of m. We will view an input x as an integer,
between 0 and 2n − 1, where the input of Pi is the ith bit of (the integer) x.
Before describing our general construction we will need the following two de<nitions.
De!nition 12. For any non-negative integer j, de<ne the level of j to be the number of
consecutive 1s that appear at the end of the binary expansion of j. This is the unique
non-negative integer i such that j≡ 2i − 1 (mod 2i+1).
De!nition 13. For any non-negative integers x and j we say that x allows j if j is of
level i and the ith bit of x is 1 (in other words, xmod 2i+1¿2i). That is, the binary
expansion of x contains 1 in the position corresponding to the rightmost 0 of the binary
expansion of j.
We are now ready to describe our protocol. Consider an arbitrary function f: {0; 1}n
→	. We de<ne a protocol  as follows. The protocol has 2n − 1 moves, which are
executed in descending order: (M2n−2; M2n−3; : : : ; M0). Move Mj is played by player
Pij , where ij is de<ned as the level of j. The initial string is de<ned as 

def= S(2n− 1),
where the function S(·) (induced by f) will be de<ned below. In move Mj, player Pij
will read nothing if xij =0, or |S( j)| bits if xij =1. In the latter case, S( j) is the string
which Pij will expect to read in Move Mj.
10
De!nition 14. For any non-negative integer x, de<ne S(x) recursively as follows:
(a) S(0)=f(0);
(b) for x¿0; S(x) is the concatenation of those S( j) (in decreasing order of indices),
where j¡x and x allows j, followed by the symbol f(x).
Examples: Here are the <rst values of S(·):
S(0) = f(0);
S(1) = S(0) ◦ f(1);
S(2) = S(1) ◦ f(2);
S(3) = S(2) ◦ S(1) ◦ S(0) ◦ f(3);
S(4) = S(3) ◦ f(4);
S(5) = S(4) ◦ S(3) ◦ S(2) ◦ S(0) ◦ f(5);
...
10 This speci<cation determines the mapping  of De<nition 1. In Corollary 20, we will show that the
speci<ed move order and the mapping  are indeed consistent with the initial string 
 and the function f.
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In order to show the correctness of our construction we need two additional de<ni-
tions.
De!nition 15. For any non-negative integers x and c; B(x; c) is the concatenation of
those S( j) (in decreasing order of indices) where x allows j and j¡c.
Lemma 16. B(x; c) is the substring of 
 that (according to the players’ expectations)
will be read after move Mc under the input x.
Proof. Consider Move Mj for some j¡c. This move is played by Pi, where i is
the level of j. By De<nition 13, x allows j iR the ith bit of x, or Pi’s input, is 1. It
follows from the description of  that the substring S( j) will be read at Move Mj iR
x allows j.
De!nition 17. For any non-negative integers x and c, we write x⊆ c if every bit in
the binary expansion of c is no less than the corresponding bit in x. (In other words,
the set naturally encoded by x is a subset of the set encoded by c.) We write x ⊂ c if
x⊆ c and x = c.
Observe that x⊆ c implies x6c.
Before we can prove our main results, we need another technical lemma.
Lemma 18. If x⊂ c, then there is a k such that x6k¡c; k is allowed by c, and k
is not allowed by x.
Proof. Let i be one of the integers such that the ith bit of c is 1 and the ith bit of
x is 0. Then cmod 2i+1¿2i and xmod 2i+1¡2i; thus, there is at least one integer k
in the range x6k¡c such that k ≡ 2i − 1 (mod 2i+1). This k is allowed by c, but not
by x.
Our main theorem is the following:
Theorem 19. For any non-negative integers x and c, x⊆ c implies that
B(x; c) ◦ f(x) 4 S(c):
Proof. This proof proceeds by induction on c−x¿0. The statement is true by de<nition
if c= x: S(x)=B(x; x) ◦f(x).
Let us now consider x⊂ c. By Lemma 18, there exist k such that x6k¡c and k is
allowed by c but not by x. Let k0 be the largest such k.
Since the string S(c) does not occur in the de<nition of B(x; c), the strings de<ning
S(c) and B(x; c) match up exactly up till S(k0) occurs in S(c), but not in B(x; c). Thus,
in order to prove the theorem, it suJces to show that B(x; k0) ◦f(x)4 S(k0). Since k0
is smaller than c, this would follow by induction, if it could be established that x⊆ k0.
Let i be the level of k0. Then k0 is the largest integer of level i that is no greater
than c (otherwise, that bigger number would have been selected as k0). Since
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k0 mod 2i+1 =2i − 1 and cmod 2i+1¿2i, the binary digits in k0 and c that correspond
to powers of 2 over 2i are equal. (Thus they dominate the corresponding bits of x.)
The ith bit of x is 0, since x does not allow k0. Thus there is no condition on the
corresponding bit in k0. 11 Finally, the bits in k0 that correspond to powers of 2 below
2i are all 1, thus dominating whatever bits x might have there.
Substituting c=2n − 1 into Theorem 19, we obtain the following corollary, which
establishes the correctness of our protocol.
Corollary 20. For any input 06x62n − 1
B(x; 2n − 1) ◦ f(x) 4 S(2n − 1):
Since 
= S(2n − 1) and (by Lemma 16) B(x; 2n − 1) is the pre;x of 
 expected to
be read on input x, this means that our substrings S( j) are consistent with 
 and f.
For a crude analysis of length(), note that |S( j)|=O( j!), implying that length()
=O(2n!)= 22
O˜(n)
. We conclude this section with the following theorem:
Theorem 21. Any function f: {0; 1}n→	 admits a private PEZ protocol with 2n− 1
moves and string length 22
O˜(n)
.
5. Open questions
Having established the universality of private PEZ computation, it remains to better
understand its complexity. Some of the more interesting open questions are
• What are the minimal string length and number of moves required for computing
the worst functions? Note that, by Corollary 3, it suJces to consider the input
concatenation function. Our general upper bound leaves room for an exponential
improvement.
• Do the answers to the above question change if one considers natural special classes
of functions, such as ( from large to small): (1) Boolean functions, (2) symmetric
functions, or (3) threshold functions? Note that for classes (2) and (3) there seems
to be no inherent reason precluding protocols with poly(n) string length. More-
over, the speci<c protocol for MAJ3 described in Fig. 1 provides some positive
evidence: its string length is 13, in comparison to 72 in the general construction for
n=3.
Appendix A. Variants of the PEZ model
In this section we discuss several natural variants of the de<nition of the private
PEZ model. Our main conclusion is that this model is quite robust: most natural
11 Which is just as well: that bit is 0 too.
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changes to its de<nition either leave it (essentially) the same, or make it (essentially)
uninteresting.
A.1. (Essentially) equivalent variants
We start with modi<cations of the problem which do not really make a diRerence.
General privacy thresholds: In our de<nition, as described in the Introduction, we
require that no subset of players can learn information about the inputs of other players
from the substrings of 
 which they read. A natural relaxation is a t-privacy require-
ment, which should hold only for subsets of at most t players. However, since our
model is deterministic, the weakest requirement of 1-privacy is already suJcient to
imply our default requirement of n-privacy.
Adaptivity and additional communication: Our de<nition requires players to be non-
adaptive: their choice of how many symbols to read cannot depend on what they have
previously seen. However, since by our privacy requirement the bits read by Pi depend
only on xi, the notion of adaptivity becomes void. Similarly, allowing the players to
directly communicate with each other over private channels would not have made a
diRerence (unless randomization is allowed). These issues will be later revisited.
Incorporating multi-output functionalities: As far as our de<nitions are concerned,
the execution of a PEZ protocol ends when the <rst unread symbol is the output of the
computation. The issue of how this output is learned by the players (e.g., by having
one of the players read it and announce it to the other players) is external to our model.
For this reason, we also do not explicitly specify who should learn the <nal output:
whether it should be learned by all players, by some strict subset of the players, or
by an external party. An even more general speci<cation of a functionality f to be
computed by the protocol can assign an arbitrary function of the input x to each player.
We now show how to naturally incorporate an output-learning stage in our model, such
that computing an arbitrary multi-output functionality f˜ : n→	n in the new model
reduces to computing some related single-output functionality f′ in the original model.
In the new model (which incorporates output learning), a special output round is added
to the end of the protocol, where each player reads one symbol. The symbol read by
Pi at the output round should be equal to its output. The privacy requirement remains
unchanged: players should learn nothing until the output round (a modi<cation of this
requirement is discussed in the next paragraph). To implement f˜ in the new model, let
f′ be a single-output function whose single output is a concatenation of the n outputs
of f˜ (so that the output alphabet of f′ is 	′=	n. Now, suppose that ′ computes
f′ in the standard model, with initial string 
′. A protocol  computing f˜ in the new
model may proceed as follows. The output alphabet of  is 	. Its string 
 will be the
natural length-n|
| conversion of 
′ to the alphabet 	. The moves of  will be the
same as in ′, except that the number of bits read in each move is multiplied by n.
Finally, at the output round, each player in its turn reads a single symbol. The protocol
 clearly computes f˜, and its privacy follows from that of ′.
Allowing players to learn the function value: In our de<nition we make the strongest
privacy requirement possible: no player or set of players is allowed to learn any in-
formation, even if such information would follow from the output of the function.
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This convention has several important advantages, most notably the fact that it allows
various manipulations of the protocols (see, e.g., Lemma 2). But it is still natural
to ask how the power of the model would change if we allow the players to learn
information that follows from their inputs and the value of the function f. (We are
assuming here that the value of f should be learned by all players; however, a similar
discussion applies to general functionalities.) For this modi<cation of the model, it is
not clear that its power remains the same. For instance, computing the function XORn
(exclusive-or of n bits) in the more liberal model eJciently reduces to computing the
function XORn−1 in the original model, which may as well be a signi<cantly easier
task. However, the extra power of the more liberal model does not extend much farther
than that. Speci<cally, consider a Boolean function f. We argue that from a protocol
for f in the liberal model, one can get a protocol in the standard model for any func-
tion f′ obtained by restricting a single variable of f. Indeed, let f′ denote the function
f with xi restricted to some value c. A standard protocol for f′ can be obtained by
simulating the liberal model with the value of Pi <xed to c. By the (relaxed) privacy
requirement of the protocol for f, player Pi should see at most two possible transcripts:
one for all inputs x such that xi = c and f(x)= c, and one for all x such that xi = c and
f(x)= 1. If these two transcripts are identical, then the protocol already satis<es the
default privacy requirement. Otherwise, the protocol can be truncated just before the
<rst point of diRerence, resulting (again) in a protocol for f′ in the standard model.
A similar argument applies even if the model is further relaxed by adding adaptivity
and direct communication between players. 12
A physically motivated variant: In the physical PEZ model we assume that it is
impossible for a player to see anything but the candies it takes out of the dispenser. In
practice, however, additional one or two candies can be seen. This concern also arises
when physically implementing PEZ protocols using a deck of cards, where the card
at the bottom of the deck is the analogue of the candy at the top of the dispenser.
A private PEZ protocol in our setting can be converted into a private PEZ protocol
in this more leaky setting by inserting a small number of “dummy” candies, of some
default color, between any two original candies.
A.2. “Uninteresting” variants
We now discuss some modi<cations of the default PEZ model which make it either
useless or essentially equivalent to other standard models.
Randomized PEZ: A seemingly interesting modi<cation of the PEZ model allows
the initial string 
 to be randomized. (This also allows to simulate private sources of
randomness.) The adaptive version of this model is very powerful, since it allows to
privately distribute arbitrarily correlated random resources to the players. Such resources
can be used, for instance, as one-time pads for performing subsequent oblivious transfer
protocols [1,11], which in turn can be used for privately computing any circuit of size
s with an initial string of length O(n2s). However, this model is not very interesting,
12 In fact, adaptivity alone is as strong: point-to-point communication channels can be simulated via an
adaptive access to the PEZ dispenser at a moderate complexity cost.
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in the sense that it is equivalent to standard secure computation with initialization by
a trusted party. Indeed, the “interactive” functionality of the PEZ dispenser can be
simulated in the latter model using standard general techniques for secure computation.
Malicious PEZ: Throughout this work, we assume that the players are honest-but-
curious. It is not hard to see that there is not much to do against malicious players
(if all other aspects of the de<nition remain the same). For instance, the player who
makes the second move can attempt to read all the remainder of 
 and see how many
symbols the <rst player took.
Non-private PEZ: We already mentioned in the introduction the non-private ver-
sion of the PEZ model and showed how any function can be easily implemented in
that model (by implementing its truth-table). Besides being unrelated to cryptography,
this model also is not very interesting from a complexity theoretic point of view.
Moreover, by allowing this model to be adaptive, it becomes as strong as the general
communication complexity model (where the PEZ dispenser can be used to implement
communication between parties).
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